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COMVENTS
THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE: CHANGES IN THE
NEW YORK LAW OF DAMAGES
The Uniform Commercial Code, already adopted by the legislatures of
eighteen states,1 will become effective in New York on September 27, 1964.2

It has been predicted that commercial law will remain unsettled in New York
for as long as thirty-five years. 3 This comment is intended to set out the

changes in the very practical field of damages, but will limit consideration
to those sections which affect the measures of and limitations on damages.

The Code sets forth two overriding rules applicable to all commercial transactions. First, recovery shall not include consequential, special, or penal

damages unless specifically allowed by the Code or some other rule of law:
Secondly, damages need not be calculable with mathematical accuracy.5
PART ONE: DAMAGES AS A SALES REMEDY
or DAM GFES
A. Seller's Damages After Resale
I.

IMEI sU

s

Under present law, in a price action0 following a seller's resale,7 the buyer

must be credited with the amount realized on the resale, while in an action
for damages for nonacceptanceP the amount so realized is only "some evidence
of market value."' 0
1. Alaska, Arkansas, Connecticut, Georgia, Illinois, Kentucky, MAassachusetts, Michigan,

New Hampshire, New Jersey, NewvMexico, New York, Ohio, Oklahoma, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island and Wyoming.
2. New York Uniform Commercial Code § 10-105 [hereinafter cited as N.Y.U.C.C.].
Note, the comments to the Code were not enacted.
3. Statement of Professor George W. Bacon, February 15, 1954, in N.Y. Leg. Doc.
No. 65(B), p. SO (1954).
4. N.Y.U.C.C. § 1-106(1).
5. Uniform Commercial Code § 1-106, comment 1.
6. N.Y. Pers. Prop. Lav § 144.
7. The seller, under certain circumstances, may resell notwithstanding that the property
in the goods has passed to the buyer. N.Y. Pers. Prop. Law §§ 134, 141.
S. Gallant Fabrics, Inc. v. Tanenbaum Textile Co., 3 App. Div. 2d ICCO, 163 N.Y.S.2d
423 (1st Dep't 1957) (memorandum decision) (title had passed; measure of damages held
to be contract price less resale price less buyer's deposit); Taylor v. Kurzroh, 214 App.
Div. 30S, 212 N.Y. Supp. 133 (1st Dep't 1925). See Higgens v. California Prune & Apricot
Growers, Inc., 16 F.2d 190 (2d Cir. 1926); IV. & H. Pride & Co. v. 1V. R. larshall & Co.,
239 Mass. 53, 131 N.E. 183 (1921).
9. N.. Pers. Prop. Law § 145.
10. Duncan v. Wohl, So. & Co., 201 App. Div. 737, 740, 195 N.Y. Supp. 331, 3S4 (2d
Dep't 1922); 3 lffliston, Sales § 582, at 243 (rev. ed. 1943) (price obtained at resale is
not condusive); see Atlantic City Tire & Rubber Co. v. Southwark Foundry & Macb.

FORDHAM LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 31

This rule has not, however, been consistently followed. The same department of the appellate division which accorded only evidentiary weight to the
resale price" has held that causes of action for the price and for nonacceptance
may be consistently joined,'1 2 and, where a resale has taken place, the measure
under both actions is the "difference between the contract price and the
amount realized on the resale."' 3 Resale price has also been held dispositive
of market price in an action for damages where there was no available market
for the goods and the resale was made within a reasonable time after the
breach.' 4
The Commercial Code, in addition to allowing an action for the price or
for damages for nonacceptance, 15 allows the seller, upon any breach by the
buyer, to resell the goods directly affected and recover damages. 10 The
many "meticulous conditions and restrictions" imposed on a seller's resale
under the Personal Property Law have, therefore, been expressly disapproved'"
and a test of commercial reasonableness substituted in their place.' 8 Thus,
where the resale is commercially reasonable, made in good faith, and reasonably
identified as referring to the broken contract, the basic measure of damages
is "the difference between the resale price and the contract price together
with any incidental damages allowed under the [Code] . . .but less expenses

saved in consequence of the buyer's breach."' 19
Co., 289 Pa. 569, 137 Atl. 807 (1927) (absent contrary evidence resale price presumed
best securable).
11. Duncan v. Wohl, So. & Co., supra note 10.
12. Anness v. Seaboard Trading Co., 230 App. Div. 69, 243 N.Y. Supp. 27 (1st Dep't
1930).
13. Id. at 70, 243 N.Y. Supp. at 29; see generally Lace Selling Co. v. Shapiro, 249
N.Y. 68, 162 N.E. 586 (1928), where the court implied that the plaintiff might resell, but
did not indicate the effect of such resale on the question of market price.
14. Hubbard v. Rockaway Lunch Co., 131 Misc. 53, 225 N.Y. Supp. 638 (Sup. Ct. 1927).
15. N.Y.U.C.C. § 2-703.
16. Uniform Commercial Code § 2-706, comment 1. These damages include incidental
damages under § 2-710, less what is saved in consequence of the buyer's breach. N.Y.U.C.C.
§ 2-706(1). This accords with present New York law. N.Y. Pers. Prop. Law §§ 132, 145.
See Sawyer v. Dean, 114 N.Y. 469, 21 N.E. 1012 (1889) (implied condonation of recovery
of incidental expenses) ; Derami, Inc. v. John B. Cabot, Inc., 277 App. Div. 852, 98
N.Y.S.2d 34 (Ist Dep't 1950) (memorandum decision) (items of expense on resale disallowed only because not supported by evidence); House v. Babcock, 63 Hun 626, 17
N.Y. Supp. 640 (Sup. Ct. 1892) (storage charges after resale included in damages). Both
N.Y. Pers. Prop. Law § 145(2) and N.Y.U.C.C. § 2-710 are rephrasings of the first rule
of Hadley v. Baxendale, 9 Welsh., H. & G. 341, 156 Eng. Rep. 145 (Ex. 1854), that Is,
that damages flowing directly and naturally are recoverable. Since consequential damages
may be awarded under the Code only when expressly provided for (N.Y.U.C.C. § 1-106),
none may be recovered here under § 2-706.
17. Uniform Commercial Code § 2-706, comment 1.
18. Ibid.
19. Ibid.

1963]

COMMENTS

The resale may be either public or private, with various conditions surrounding both types.- One purpose of resale under the Code then is to fix
damages, and evidence of market price will be "relevant only on the question
of whether the seller acted in a commercially reasonable manner in making the
resale." 21 Passage of title to the buyer, which permitted a seller's price action
under the Personal Property Law, will no longer be a condition precedent
for substituting resale price for market price.' Furthermore, the place for
resale is to be governed solely by a test of commercial reasonableness, and is
not restricted to the agreed place of delivery.
At present, where a resale by the seller results in a profit, he need not account
for that profit to the original buyer.2 4 Similarly, one in the position of a seller,25
or a buyer who rightfully rescinds - 2c-7 acquires the rights of an unpaid seller,
including the right to retain profits.
The Code fixes damages to benefit a person in the "position of a seller,'
and "a buyer who has rightfully rejected or justifiably revoked acceptance," and has paid part of the price or has reasonably incurred expenses with
respect to the rejected goods.3 0 It is clear that these parties, as defined by the
Code, embrace their counterparts 3 ' in the Personal Property Law. The Code
permits them, as it does the aggrieved seller, to sell the goods held - and
damages, 33 the difference between the sale price
recover, along with incidental
34
and the contract price.
20. N.Y.U.C.C. § 2-706. If the sale is public, "it must be made at a usual place or
market for public -ale . . ." and unless goods are perishable or may decline in value
speedily, reasonable notice of the sale's time and place must be given the buyer, and
reasonable inspection must be provided for if the goods are not within view. N.Y.U.C.C.
§ 2-706(4). "Where the resale is at private sale the seller must give the buyer reasonable
notification of his intention to resell." N.Y.U.C.C. § 2-706(3).
21. Uniform Commercial Code § 2-706, comment 3.
22. Ibid. See notes 6-9 supra and accompanying text.
23. Uniform Commercial Code § 2-706, comment 5; New York seems never to have
imposed this restriction, e.g., Duncan v. Wohl, So. & Co., 210 App. Div. 737, 195 N.Y.
Supp. 381 (2d Dep't 1922) (resale made by seller's traveling salesman).
24. N.Y. Pers. Prop. Law § 141(1). D'Aprile v. Turner-Looker Co., 239 N.Y. 427, 147
N.E. 15 (1925).
25. N.Y. Pers. Prop. Law §§ 133(2), 141(1).
26. N.Y. Pers. Prop. Law § 150(5).
27. N.Y.. Pers. Prop. Law § 150(5) gives the rightfully rejecting buyer the rights of
an unpaid seller under § 134, which section includes the right to resell according to
§ 141(1). See Joaness Bros. v. Lamborn, 237 N.Y. 207, 142 N.E. 587 (1923) (dictum).
28. N.Y.U.C.C. § 2-707. Generally, this is one holding "a security interest or other
right in goods similar to that of a seller." Ibid.
29. N.Y.U.C.C. § 2-706(6).
30. N.Y.U.C.C. § 2-711(3).
31.
32.
33.
34.

See note 27 supra and accompanying text.
N.Y.U.C.C. §§ 2-706, 2-707(2).
N.Y.U.C.C. § 2-707(2).
N.Y.U.C.C. § 2-706(1).
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While the Code permits a seller to retain all profits on a resale," any
excess over the security interest of one in
the position of seller, or a rightfully
6
rejecting buyer must be accounted for.3
B. Seller's Damages on Completion of Manufacture
When a contract calling for the manufacture and sale of goods is breached,
the aggrieved seller is, at present, afforded several alternative remedies. He
7
is, of course, under no obligation to complete the manufacturing process.3
He may then sue for those damages directly and naturally resulting from the
buyer's repudiation,3 8 the measure of which will include his profit, 0 plus the
costs of manufacture wasted by abandonment of performance.40 Completing
the process and suing for the price, on the other hand, presents a problem,
especially if this attempt to mitigate aggravates the damages.
Presently, if the price in a manufacturing contract is not payable "on a day
certain," and the goods are readily resalable, title must first pass to the
buyer in order for the seller to be able to maintain an action for the price. 41
Under New York's Personal Property Law, title to future goods4 2 passes when
they are unconditionally appropriated to the contract by the seller or buyer
with the other's assent.43 Thus, whether the seller might complete and identify
the goods and maintain an action for the price would depend upon the unlikely
prospect of the buyer's assenting to an appropriation.
The Commercial Code removes the necessity for assent. It permits a manufacturing seller to complete the process, if such would be commercially
reasonable, identify the goods to the contract, 44 and then, if other conditions
permit, sue for the price. 45 It should be noted, however, that while this change
is a liberalization of the existing law, an action for the price is still restricted
35. N.Y.U.C.C. § 2-706(6).
36. Ibid.
37. Oswego Falls Pulp & Paper Co. v. Stecher Lithograph Co., 215 N.Y. 98, 109 N.E.
92 (1915); Meyer Bros. Drug Co. v. McKinney, 137 App. Div. 541, 121 N.Y. Supp. 845
(3d Dep't 1910), aff'd mem., 203 N.Y. 533, 96 N.E. 1122 (1911); see generally Todd v.
Gamble, 148 N.Y. 382, 42 N.E. 982 (1896).
38. N.Y. Pers. Prop. Law § 145(2).
39. N.Y. Pers. Prop. Law § 145(4). "The profit the seller would have made . . .
shall be considered ...
." Ibid.
40. Meyer Bros. Drug Co. v. McKinney, 137 App. Div. 541, 121 N.Y. Supp. 845 (3d
Dep't 1910), aff'd mem., 203 N.Y. 533, 96 N.E. 1122 (1911) (losses sustained and gains
prevented). See Lieberman v. Templar Motor Co., 236 N.Y. 139, 140 N.E. 222 (1923);
Franklin Paper Co. v. Krohnberg, 186 App. Div. 903, 172 N.Y. Supp. 891 (2d Dep't 1918)
(memorandum decision); Thomas v. Cauldwell, 26 N.Y. Supp. 785 (Super. Ct. 1893).
41. N.Y. Pers. Prop. Law § 144.
42. These are "goods to be manufactured or acquired by the seller after the making
of the contract of sale." N.Y. Pers. Prop. Law § 156.
43. N.Y. Pers. Prop. Law § 100, Rule 4(1).
44.

N.Y.U.C.C. § 2-704(2).

45.

N.Y.U.C.C. § 2-709(I)(b).
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by the condition that the circumstances must reasonably indicate that an
attempt at resale would be unavailing.4
As to recovering an increase in damages caused by a reasonable but unsuccessful good faith effort to mitigate, the Code is in direct opposition to the
Personal Property Law. The latter provides that if the buyer repudiates while
the seller is in the midst of manufacturing, he can be liable "for no greater
damages than the seller would have suffered if he did nothing toward carrying
out the contract . . ." after repudiation.47 New York Personal Property Law
Section 145(4) leaves no doubt that such an effort by the seller to mitigate
his damages will be unrewarded.4 8 Had he been successful in mitigating, his
damages would probably have been limited to lost profits, or even been reduced
to nominal damages if a contract equal to the one breached could have been
procured, but he must now bear the loss, caused by a fall in the market or
other unforeseen circumstances.
This conclusion has been reached by many authorities who argue that the
seller should not be allowed to complete the process and thereby enhance his
damages 4 9 It is claimed that two classes of cases support this view. The first
encompasses service contracts where proper mitigation could only involve
seeking other employment.5° The second involves sellers who insist on completing contracts which can only result in greater loss, as when the product
is one for which there will be no market when completed.51 These cases,
however, seem to have little bearing on the situation in question, i.e., where
proper mitigation is both commercially reasonable and made in good faith.
In those situations where completion was useless as a means of mitigation,
the condemnation is based on the fact that the plaintiff must act "to save" the
defendant from further damage "so far as it was in his power.'a 2 The anomolous
result produced by this rule is that a seller successful in mitigating is commended, 53 while one unsuccessful, even though he may have acted reasonably
and in good faith, is denied the amount of the increase in damagesP'
A repudiation of a contract to manufacture, therefore, should not be considered an exception to the accepted rule that the costs of good faith and
reasonable efforts at mitigating damages are to be assessed to the defendant. 5
46.
47.
43.
49.

Ibid.
N.Y. Pers. Prop. Law § 145(4).
See note 54 infra and accompanying text.
3 Urilliston, Sales § 5S9, at 270 (rev. ed. 1943); 1 Clark, Damages § 117, at 213

(1925).
50. Clark v. Mlarsiglia, 1 Denio 317 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1845) (per curiam); see Johnson
v. Meeker, 96 N.Y. 93 (1334) (contract of rental and services).
51. Dillon v. Anderson, 43 N.Y. 231 (1870) (specially ordered boilers).
52. Id. at 237.
53. See Buchman v. Aillville Mlfg. Co., 17 F.2d 983 (2d Cir. 1927).
54. N.Y. Pers. Prop. Law § 145(4); Woolf v. Hamburger, 129 App. Div. 833, 114
N.Y. Supp. 136 (1st Dep't 1909); 1 Clark, Damages § 117, at 213 (1925) (damages due

to failure to stop work are nonrecoverable); 3 ,rdliston, Sales § 5S9 (rev. ed. 1943).
55. Den Norske Ameriekalinje Actiesselskabet v. Sun Printing & Publishing Ass'n, 226
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Indeed, some courts have recognized this. It has been said that "a reasonable
choice . . . [in completing or not] is all that the defaulting buyer can
demand,"56 and, where goods were in the last stage of manufacture, "the
plaintiff [is] . . . entitled to finish manufacture and recover therefor."'
The Code now permits completion where it is the result of an "exercise of
reasonable commercial judgment for the purposes of avoiding loss and of effective realization . . .,"5
with the burden on the buyer to show the contrary. 0
When such a course of action is pursued by the seller, the goods are then made
available for resale under the resale section, or, where allowed, may be the
subject of an action for the price.60
C. Seller's Damages for Nonacceptance or Repudiation
Section 2-708(l) of the Code provides that the measure of damages for
nonacceptance or repudiation is generally the difference between "the market
price at the time and place for tender and the unpaid contract price"
plus any incidental damages. 6' If this measure is "inadequate to put the seller
in as good a position as performance would have," however, the seller may
recover the profits he would have made had the buyer fully performed, including incidental damages, with "due allowance for costs reasonably incurred
' 62
and due credit for payments or proceeds of resale."
This provision is a rewording of New York Personal Property Law Section
145(3) which codified the common-law rule, formulated long before the present
era of mass production. 63 It was reasoned that when an aggrieved seller was
able to minimize his damages by making a substitute sale, he could be fully
compensated by the difference between the amount he might have obtained on
resale and the contract price. 64 When the seller was unable to procure a substitute contract, however, this constituted "special circumstances" 00 which
enabled him to recover a greater amount. This was true where the goods had
N.Y. 1, 122 N.E. 463 (1919); Johnson v. Meeker, 96 N.Y. 93 (1884); Dillon v. Anderson,
43 N.Y. 231 (1870).
56. Buchman v. Millville Mfg. Co., 17 F.2d 983, 986 (2d Cir. 1926).
57. Stroock Plush Co. v. Talcott, 150 App. Div. 343, 356, 134 N.Y. Supp. 1052, 1061
(2d Dep't 1912); Soss Mfg. Co. v. Mitchell Motors Co., 119 Misc. 290, 196 N.Y. Supp.
304 (Sup. Ct. 1922).
58. N.Y.U.C.C. § 2-704(2).
59. Uniform Commercial Code § 2-704, comment 2.
60. Uniform Commercial Code § 2-704, comment 1.
61. N.Y.U.C.C. § 2-708(1). The seller's incidental damages are defined in § 2-710 and
allow recovery for expenses reasonably incurred because of the buyer's breach. See N.Y.
Pers. Prop. Law §§ 132, 145, 151.
62. N.Y.U.C.C. § 2-708(2).
63. See Poppenberg v. R. M. Owen & Co., 84 Misc. 126, 146 N.Y. Supp. 478 (Sup,
Ct. 1914); e.g., Cahen v. Platt, 69 N.Y. 348 (1877).
64. Cahen v. Platt, supra note 63, at 352.
65. N.Y. Pers. Prop. Law § 145(3).
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been manufactured especially for the buyer, 60 where the goods were not in
esse at the time of the breach, 7 or where because of other circumstances,
they had no ready market value. 6 In these situations some courts allowed a
seller to recover the loss of his bargain, i.e., his profits under the contractPco
Others, however, have denied recovery of profits where fixed priced articles
were involved because such goods had a constant and ready market value, and,
therefore, no "special circumstances" existed. 70 The measure applied was the
contract price less market value, and since with fixed priced goods71 these were
identical, the seller would only be entitled to nominal damages.
The Code allows recovery of lost profits "in all appropriate cases, which
would include all standard priced goods. "72- This clearly produces the more
equitable result. 73 The value of a contract for fixed priced goods to the seller
is not determined by a market value based on supply and demand. With
respect to these goods the market does not fall, or rise, increasing the pecuniary
value of the contract to the seller, or buyer respectively, but rather the contract
price and market value are always the same. The fact that the market for
fixed priced goods does not fluctuate certainly does not mean that the contract was valueless to the seller. An automobile dealer, for example, sells cars
66. Lieberman v. Templar Motor Co., 236 N.Y. 139, 140 N.E. 222 (1923) (Epecially
designed automobile bodies) ; Todd v. Gamble, 14S N.Y. 3S2, 42 N.E. 932 (1S96) (chemical
which must be specially ordered because perishable if kept any length of time).
67. Oswego Falls Pulp & Paper Co. v. Stecher Lithographic Co., 215 N.Y. 98, 169 N.E.
92 (1915); Belle of Bourbon Co. v. Leffler, 37 App. Div. 302, 84 N.Y. Supp. 385 (Ist
Dep't 1903).
68. Thomas Gordon Malting Co. v. Bartels Brewing Co., 205 N.Y. 523, ICD N.E. 457
(1912) (malt sold only upon order during specified seasons).
69. "Profits" under the Code are normally the "list price less the cost to the dealer or
listprice less manufacturing cost to the manufacturer." Uniform Commercial Code
§ 2-70S, comment 2. This is in accord with existing lax,. Lieberman v. Templar Motor
Co., 236 N.Y. 139, 149, 140 N.E. 222, 225 (1923); but see Gospel v. Kurtz Action Co.,
179 App. Dix. 6S7, 167 N.Y. Supp. 317 (1st Dep't 1917) (contract price less "reasonable
cost" of manufacture).
70. A. Lenobel, Inc. v. Senif, 252 App. Div. 533, 300 N.Y. Supp. 226 (2d Dep't 1937);
Genovese v. A. Lenobel, Inc., 14S Misc. 54S, 265 N.Y. Supp. 33S (N.Y.C. Munic. Ct. 1933),
rev'd on other grounds, 154 Misc. 91, 275 N.Y. Supp. 521 (2d Dep't 1934).
71. Genovese v. A. Lenobel, Inc., supra note 70, at 550, 265 N.Y. Supp. at 340. Under
existing law, however, the seller is not entirely without a remedy. For instance, he could
keep a down payment of up to 20%,o of the price (N.Y. Pers. Prop. Law § 145-a(1);
cf. N.Y.U.C.C. § 2-718(2), or provide in the contract of sale that title vas to pass to
the buyer when the sale was made (N.Y. Pers. Prop. Law §9 99, 160) and then hold the
goods and sue for the price (N.Y. Pers. Prop. Law § 144), or provide in the contract
that his "relations with [his] . . . manufacturers and the effect thereof in reference to
. Lenobel, Inc. v.
"
[his] . . . overhead should be deemed 'special circumstances'
Senif, supra note 70, at 536, 300 N.Y. Supp. at 230.
72. Uniform Commercial Code § 2-70S, comment 2.
73. The provision is "designed to eliminate the unfair and economically vasteful results
arising under the older law when fixed price articles were involved." Ibid.
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at a price "recommended" by his manufacturer. His source of supply is, to an
extent, unlimited, in that he can usually obtain as many cars as he has purchasers. However, the demand for cars is clearly not as great as his ability
to supply them. Not everyone in his area will buy a car; some will not buy
his make of car, others will only purchase a car every two or three years. Not
everyone desires a red coupe. Assuming that a red coupe is the subject of a
broken sales contract, it cannot be said that a ready market exists, or that
when the dealer does resell the coupe he has made a substitute sale. He would
have made this second sale anyway. 74 Meanwhile he has lost a considerable
amount of money spent in "selling" the car to the breaching buyer. His expenses would even include a certain proportion of his overhead. Consequently,
the seller is damaged when he resells, in that the number of purchasers available to him has been reduced by one, and his overhead has received "no contribution from the gross profits on at least one sale."" This does not seem
answered by the fact that the buyer could have assigned his contract to someone
else in the area, producing the same result. It would seem that unless the
breaching buyer, himself, procures a substitute buyer who would not otherwise
have bought a red coupe, the dealer is damaged.
Thus, under present law, a seller of fixed priced goods does not seem adequately compensated. In order to put him in the position he would have been
in had the contract been fully performed, it is necessary that he recover the value
of his bargain.76 Furthermore, where his source of supply exceeds the demand,
this must necessarily be his lost profits.7" Allowing recovery for lost profits

does not seem harsh on the buyer, for he is on notice that the seller has certain operating costs, and he certainly is aware that the seller has entered into
the contract for profit.
[P]rofits or advantages which are the direct and immediate fruits of the contract ...
are presumed to have been taken into consideration and deliberated upon before the
contract was made and formed ....
Such being the relative position of the contracting parties, it is difficult to comprehend why, in case one party has deprived the other of the gains or profits of
the contract by refusing to perform it, this loss should not constitute a proper item
in estimating the damages. To separate it from the general loss would seem to be
74. "If the contract had not been broken, a second [car] . . .would have been sold
and the dealer would have made the profit on two sales instead of one." Mason & Risch,
Ltd. v. Christner, 47 Ont. L.R. 52 (1920). The same would hold true if instead of a dealer
the seller were a manufacturer, on the theory that either his supply was greater than
his demand, or that he could have increased production to meet the demand. See Mount
Pleasant Stable Co. v. Steinberg, 238 Mass. 567, 131 N.E. 295 (1921); but see Bilsbee
Linseed Corp. v. Paragon Paint & Varnish Corp., 96 F.2d 464 (2d Cir. 1938).
75. See A. Lenobel, Inc. v. Senif, 252 App. Div. 533, 536, 300 N.Y. Supp. 226, 229
(2d Dep't 1937).
76. The remedies of the Code are to be liberally administered to this end. N.Y.U.C.C.
§ 1-106(1).
77. In this manner he recovers the value of one sale.
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doing violence 78to the intention and understanding of the parties, and severing the
contract itself.
. Difficultkes of Proving Market Price
In an ordinary breach of contract case, proof of the difference between the
contract price and the market price poses few difficulties.70 But where the
breach is anticipatory and the injured party is entitled to sue immediately,
an endeavor is made under existing law to determine what the market price
would have been at the law day and not at the time of the breach.8 This
has presented many difficulties where the action comes to trial before the
law day since the jury must speculate what the market value wold be
in the future.81
As previously noted, section 2-708 requires that the seller's damages be
based on the market price of the goods "at the time and place for tender." -2
Section 2-723 qualifies this by providing that if the action comes to trial
before the time for performance with respect to some or all of the goods, any
damages based on market price . . . shall be determined according to the price of
such goods prevailing at the time when the aggrieved party learned of the
83
repudiation.
The problem of proving and estimating a future market has thus been eliminated.81
If the times and places for performance set out in the Code9 are rigidly
adhered to, however, great injustice might result where the goods have no
ascertainable market at those times or places. Consequently, in accordance
with existing law, the Code allows the court to make due allowance for cost
of transportation and determine market price at "any reasonable time . . . or
. . . any other place which in commercial judgment or under usage of trade
would serve as a reasonable substitute.... ."80 The Code adds, however, that
78. Masterton & Smith v. The Mayor, 7 Hill 61, 69 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1S77).
79. N.Y. Pers. Prop. Laws §§ 145(3), 14S(3).
SO. W7idmuller v. Pope, 107 N.Y. 674, 14 N.E. 436 (1S37); John Dimon Corp. v.
Federal Sugar Ref. Co., 215 App. Div. 140, 213 N.Y. Supp. IC6 (Ist Dep't 1925).
31. Goldfarb v. Campe Corp., 99 Misc. 475, 164 N.Y. Supp. 583 (N.Y. City Ct. 1917).
"Error in the jury's ascertainment of the probable current price on the future date is one
of the risks which the vendor assumes in advance renunciation and the vendee assumes
in seeking trial before the delivery date arrives.' Id. at 4S4. See 3 Williston, Sales § SS7
(rev. ed. 194S).
S2. N.Y.U.C.C. § 2-703(1).
S3. N.Y.u.C.C. § 2-723(1).
34. In a case where there is a breach by the seller, market price is determined as of
the time the buyer learned of the breach, regardless of whether the trial is before or after
the law day. N.Y.U.C.C. § 2-713.
S5. E.g., N.Y.U.C.C. §§ 2-703, 2-713, 2-723.
S6. N.Y.U.C.C. § 2-723(2). See Durst v. Burton, 47 N.Y. 167, 175 (1372) (evidence
of another time and place would be material where it tended to prove the value at the
place of delivery).
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in order for a party to present evidence based on times or places other than
those set out in the Sales Article, he must give the other
party "such notice
87
as the court finds sufficient to prevent unfair surprise."
E. Buyer's Damages for Nondelivery or Repudiation
New York Personal Property Law Section 148(3) provides that where a
seller fails to deliver goods for which there is an available market the buyer
may recover, in the absence of special circumstances showing proximate
damages of a greater amount, the difference between the contract price and
the market price "at the time or times when [the goods] . . . ought to have
been delivered, or, if no time was fixed, then at the time of the refusal to
deliver." 88 The Commercial Code determines market price "at the time when
the buyer learned of the breach. '89 In an ordinary case, therefore, the change
is slight, for a buyer generally learns of a breach at the time fixed for delivery.
On the other hand, being unaware of the breach, and having no means of
discovering it at that time has been held to constitute "special circumstances"
and, therefore, the time when the damages are to be measured was shifted to
"the date when the buyer knew or should have known of the default." 0 The
reason for this exception was that the general rule rested upon an assumption
that the buyer was able, upon a breach, to "protect himself against the consequences of a rising market by buying from others." 9' This could not be done
unless he had knowledge of the breach when it occurred. In the case of an
anticipatory repudiation, however, damages are measured at the time fixed
in the contract upon the theory that the buyer has only bargained for the
value of a performance at that time.9 2 This resulted in problems of proof where
the action came to trial before the contract law day, since it was
necessary for
93
the jury to speculate what the market would be in the future.
Under the Code, the damages in all cases fixed are at the time the buyer
learned of the breach. This remedy is alternative to the buyer's right to "cover,"
94
and applies only to the extent that the buyer has not "covered.
The old section 148(3) does not specify a place for determining market price.
Subsection (2) of section 2-713, however, provides that:
Market price is to be determined as of the place for tender, or, in cases of rejection
after arrival or revocation of acceptance, as of the place of arrival.
87.

N.Y.U.C.C. § 2-723(3).

88.
89.
90.

N.Y. Pers. Prop. Law § 148(3).
N.Y.U.C.C. § 2-713(1). (Emphasis added.)
Perkins v. Minford, 235 N.Y. 301, 305, 139 N.E. 276, 277 (1923).

91.

Ibid.

92. John Dimon Corp. v. Federal Sugar Ref. Co., 215 App. Div. 140, 213 N.Y. Supp. 106
(Ist Dep't 1925).
93. See notes 80 & 81 supra and accompanying text.
94. Uniform Commercial Code § 2-713, comment 5. The buyer's right to "cover," I.e.,
purchase substitute goods, and the damages recoverable in the event he does so are
provided for in § 2-712.
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The place for tender is to be determined either by the agreement, if it is
expressed, or by the Code. 5 Under the Code the place for tender is the place
at which the seller should complete his performance,00 whether by delivery
of the goods to a carrier, T or by their arrival at the agreed destinationP 5
This is substantially in accord with existing New York case law which holds
that "damages are to be estimated according to the conditions prevailing at
the place where the final act of performance was due from the vendor.'3
Thus, the buyer is entitled to the value of the goods at the place where the
parties intended that the performance be completed.
F. Buyer's Damages After Covcring'11
Where goods with an available market are not delivered, the buyer can
presently recover, absent a showing of greater proximate damage, "the difference between the contract price and the market or current price of the goods
at the time or times when they ought to have been delivered, or, if no time vas
fixed, then at the time of the refusal to deliver." 10 ' As with the aggrieved
seller, the problem arises whether a buyer's "cover" or repurchase price is conclusive evidence of market price.
To admit testimony of the price which the buyer paid on his repurchase, I t 2
or to charge that the measure of a buyer's damages is the difference between
that price and the contract price, has been held reversible error,10 3 since "the
true rule.., is the difference between the contract price and the market price...
at the times when deliveries should have been made."' 0 4 However, one lower
court decision subsequent to these rulings awarded a buyer the difference
between his contract price and the repurchase price paid in the open market.00 :
The same department of the appellate division which established the former
restrictive rule, later implied that evidence of the repurchase price might be
95. N.Y.U.C.C. § 2-503(1). There are several Code sections which could have some
bearing on the place for tender, e.g., §§ 1-205, 2-30S, 2-319, 2-504, 2-513, 2-614.
96. Uniform Commercial Code § 2-503, comment 1, states that "tender" is "such per-

formance by the tendering party as puts the other party in default if he fails to proceed
in some manner." See N.Y. Leg. Doc. No. 65(C), p. 365 (1955).
97. N.Y.U.C.C. § 2-504(a).

9S. N.Y.U.C.C. § 2-503(3).
99. Standard Casing Co. v. California Casing Co., 233 N.Y. 413, 419, 135 N.E. 834,
836 (1922).
100. Uniform Commercial Code § 2-712, comment 1.
101. N.Y. Pers. Prop. Law § 14S(3).
102. Thedford v. Herbert, 135 App. Div. 174, 119 N.Y. Supp. 1025 (Ist Dep't 1909).
103. Rosenthal v. Empire Brick & Supply Co., 123 App. Div. 503, 10S N.Y. Supp. 347
(1st Dep't 1903) (held error to charge the measure as the difference between contract
and repurchase price).
104. Thedford v. Herbert, 135 App. Div. 174, 177, 119 N.Y. Supp. 1025, 1028 (Ist
Dep't 1909).
105. Moers v. Dietz, 52 Misc. 173, 101 N.Y. Supp. 590 (App. T. 1906) (goods described
only as "certain metal").
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considered if such repurchase did not take place too long after the delivery
date. 06
The dispute in these cases arose, of course, from the higher price the buyer
had to pay for substitute goods. Where this price was less than the market
price, it was the measure of damages since the buyer has "properly reduced the
1 7
o
damages by buying.., in the cheapest market ....
The rule first stated is most probably the law of New York. Many commentators, on the other hand, have favored the more liberal view that the
repurchase price should at least be taken as evidence of market value, 10 8
and that a prompt repurchase, although at a price greater than the contract
price, should of itself fix the damages.' 0 9
The present Code section, in its basic measure, enacts the more liberal view:
"The buyer may recover ... the difference between the cost of cover and the
contract price ..
."110 All that is required of a buyer who wishes to avail
himself of this remedy is that the "cover" purchase be reasonable and made
"in good faith and without unreasonable delay. . ... " If such is the nature
of the "cover" purchase, it may be on different credit or delivery terms, or
may even involve a series of contracts for goods which are nonidentical "but
commercially usable as reasonable substitutes under the circumstances. .. ,1.
The test to be applied is what is reasonable for this buyer to have done under
circumstances peculiar to him and his contract." 3 The criterion of his conduct
is, therefore, not to be established by hindsight." 4 When he fails to effect
"cover" within this section, he is, of course, not barred from the alternate
remedy of an action for damages for nondelivery or repudiation.1
As has been stressed, the remedy under the instant section is integral, and
completely effective without reference to market price. Its character may, however, be better understood by a more detailed comparison with the commonlaw rule. Under the latter, where the seller failed to deliver the goods after
title had passed, the damages awarded were for conversion, 11 and in a fluctuating market these might be based on the highest price within a reasonable
106. Senner & Kaplan Co. v. Gera Mills, 185 App. Div. 562, 570, 173 N.Y. Supp. 265,
270-71 (1st Dep't 1918); see Seaboard Brick Co. v. Bonacci, 153 App. Div. 43, 137 N.Y.
Supp. 1026 (1st Dep't 1912) (lack of evidence of reasonableness of repurchase price).
107. Fechheimer Iron & Steel Co. v. Baress, 122 N.Y. Supp. 683, 684 (App. T. 1910).
See Corn Planter Ref. Co. v. George R. Jenkins & Co., 217 Ill. App. 139 (1920); 3 Wllliston, Sales § 599(g), at 309 (rev. ed. 1948).
108. 3 Williston, Sales § 599(h), at 312 (rev. ed. 1948).
109. McCormick, Damages § 175, at 668 (1935).
110. N.Y.U.C.C. § 2-712(2).
111. N.Y.U.C.C. § 2-712(1).
112. Uniform Commercial Code § 2-712, comment 2.
113. Ibid.
114. Ibid.
115. N.Y.U.C.C. § 2-712(3).
116. N.Y. Pers. Prop. Law § 147.
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time after the buyer learned of the conversion.1 17 Since a buyer's "cover" must
be made within a similar period," 8 the time at which damages would be fixed
would be the same although the amount arrived at as the damages could well
differ since a "cover" in excess of market price is certainly not unreasonable
per se." 9 As to the place of fixing damages, the Code necessarily focuses on
the buyer's market.1'2 In the case of a fluctuating market, this would effect
little change, since the selection of time, and therefore place, was the buyer's.12
Where title has not passed to the buyer, however, his damages are based
upon the market at the time and place of delivery. 1 ' Since the buyer under
the Code may "cover" immediately upon repudiation, 12 3 the time for setting
damages has been accelerated.2 4 Generally, the seller's place of business is the
place for delivery under the Personal Property Law, 12 3 and, unless the buyer
is to pay the freight, delivery to a carrier sets the place of delivery.120 Under
the present Code section, the buyer's choice of a covering market establishes
'
the "place."' 2

G. Buyer's Right To Deduct Damages From the Price
New York Personal Property Law Section 150(1) (a) provides that:
Where there is a breach of warranty by the seller, the buyer may, at his election,
(a) Accept or keep the goods and set up against the seller the breach of warranty
by way of recoupment in diminution or extinction of the price ....
This section gives the buyer a defensive right of recoupment for any breach
of warranty. 2 8 That is, the claim of the buyer, rather than constituting a
positive right in the nature of a counterclaim, 120 is considered to be in diminution of the seller's right to the price. Peuser v. Marsh,2' applying this provi117. Wright v. Bank of the Metropolis, 110 N.Y. 237, IS N.E. 79 (1SS) (plaintiff may
repurchase); Jones v. National Chautauqua County Bank, 272 App. Div. 521, 74 N.Y.S.2d
49S (4th Dep't 1947).

118. N.Y.U.C.C. § 2-712(1).
119. Uniform Commerdal Code § 2-712, comment 2.
120. N.Y. Leg. Doc. No. 65(C), p. 237 (1955).
121. See notes 116-17 supra and accompanying text.
122. See note 101 supra and accompanying text; Lipschitz v. Rosenberger, 43 N.Y.S.2d
64 (App. T. 1943).
123.

N.Y.U.C.C. § 2-711(1) (a).

124.

N.Y. Leg. Doc. No. 65(C),

p. 237

(1955).

New York has not allowed this

acceleration of the time for measuring damages. John Dimon Corp. v. Federal Sugar Ref.
Co., 215 App. Div. 140, 213 N.Y. Supp. 1C6 (1st Dep't 1925); Goldfarb v. Campo Corp.,
99 lisc. 475, 164 N.Y. Supp. 5S3 (N.Y. City CL 1917).
125. N.Y. Pers. Prop. Law § 124.
126. Standard Casing Co. v. California Casing Co., 233 N.Y. 413, 135 N.E. S34 (1922).
127.

N.Y.U.C.C. § 2-712; N.Y. Leg. Doc. No. 65(C), p. 233 (1955).

128.
129.

Id. at 245.
3 Williston, Sales §§ 605, 605a (rev. ed. 1948).

130. 218 N.Y. 505, 113 N.E. 494 (1916).
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sion, held that where goods in a conditional sale were not as warranted, the
buyer could defend against the seller's action for replevin or the purchase price
by setting up his damages in extinction of the balance due. The assertion of
the buyer's right of recoupment is, however, not restricted to a technical
defense in an action by the seller, for he may deduct his damages for a warranted defect in the goods from a balance due on the purchase price."'
Furthermore, under a contract calling for successive shipments of goods with
the price payable on delivery, it seems that he may, upon notice to the seller,
deduct from the price due on a shipment 132 those damages arising from a
defective prior shipment, without relieving the seller of his duty to complete
133
performance.
Section 2-717 of the Code provides:
The buyer on notifying the seller of his intention to do so may deduct all or any
part of the damages resulting from any breach of the contract from any part of
the price still due under the same contract.
The comments to this section further emphasize the expansion of the
remedy in question: "This section ... does not limit the relief to cases of breach
of warranty as did the prior uniform statutory provision.' 3 4 The clarity
of this language dispenses with any need for further explanation except with
respect to the type of notice required.
Generally, to preserve his remedy, "the buyer must within a reasonable time
after he discovers or should have discovered any breach notify the seller of
breach. . . ."135 This notification need only inform "the seller that the transaction is claimed to involve a breach .... "30 This much, however, will not
satisfy the present Code provision. The notice given must be such as "reasonably indicates the buyer's reason for holding up his payment. . . ."37 Failure to
give such notice places the buyer in default "within the meaning of the section
on insecurity and right to assurances. "138
131. N.Y. Pers. Prop. Law § 150(1) (a); Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co. v. Vulcanized
Prods. Co., 228 N.Y. 118, 126, 126 N.E. 710, 712 (1920) (dictum); Goodyear Tire &
Rubber Co. v. Hershenstein, 221 App. Div. 592, 224 N.Y. Supp. 501 (1st Dep't 1927).
132. Ibid.; Bradley v. King, 44 Ill. 339, 341 (1867) (dictum) (payment of Installment
by setting off damages condoned); see Harber Bros. v. Moffat Cycle Co., 151 Ill.84,
37 N.E. 676 (1894); Note, 28 Colum. L. Rev. 957 (1928).
133. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co. v. Hershenstein, 221 App. Div. 592, 224 N.Y. Supp.
501 (1st Dep't 1927). See De Forest Radio & Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Triangle Radio Supply
Co., 243 N.Y. 283, 153 N.E. 75 (1926); Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co. v. Vulcanized
Prods. Co., 228 N.Y. 118, 126 N.E. 710 (1920).
134. Uniform Commercial Code § 2-717, comment 1.
135. N.Y.U.C.C. § 2-607(3)(a).
136. Uniform Commercial Code § 2-607, comment 4.
137. Uniform Commercial Code § 2-717, comment 2. (Emphasis added.)
138. Uniform Commercial Code § 2-717, comment 2.
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II.

LnIITATIONS ON DAMAGES

A. Liquidations and Limitations
At present, whether a liquidated damage clause will be enforced depends in
large measure upon a finding that the amount stipulated in the clause is
reasonable in light of what the parties anticipated, when entering into the
contract, as the loss to be suffered upon a breach. "[T]he look for-ard, and
not backward. . .

"

has been considered the test.' 5 The New York Court

of Appeals has stated that "the agreement is to be interpreted as of its
date, not as of its breach,"' 40 or even "by events subsequent to the making of
the agreement ....

1141

The Code validates a liquidated damage clause if, among other things, it
is "reasonable in the light of the anticipated or actual harm .... " 1 4 2 The comments to this section speak of what is "reasonable in the light of the circumstances,"' 43 and thus a liquidated damage clause unreasonable by the "anticipated harm" test, may now be validated if reasonable in vier., of the actual
loss. This is a logical result. If a contract contains a damage clause so large
that it is unreasonable in light of the anticipatedloss, it must be presumed that
the risk of such a forfeiture was well considered and compensated for in the
consideration sought in return. This argument clearly has far more validity
14
than the similar one usually given in support of the "contemplation" test,
for in the case of a liquidated damage clause an attempt has in fact been made
to assess losses. Thus, when the actual loss is found to be commensurate with
the previously unreasonable estimate, the liquidation clause should not be
disposed of as a "penalty."
Under present New York law there is no provision allowing a buyer in
default to recover that part of his payments to the seller over and above the
latter's actual damages. New York case law, however, is hardly as noncommittal. Except in those instances where part payment could be construed as
a "deposit,"' 45 a payment on the purchase price,' 40 whether in goods or
cash, 47 was simply not recoverable by a defaulting buyer even when he re139. Banta v. Stamford Motor Co., S9 Conn. 51, 56, 92 At. 665, 667 (1914). See
S Corbin, Contracts § 1059 (1951); Restatement, Contracts § 339 (1932) (reasonable
forecast).
140. Seidlitz v. Auerbach, 230 N.Y. 167, 172, 129 N.E. 461, 462 (1920).
141. Dunn v. Morgenthau, 73 App. Div. 147, 149, 76 N.Y. Supp. 827, 829 (1st Dep't
1902), aff'd mem., 175 N.Y. 518, 67 N.E. 1031 (1903).

142. N.Y.U.C.C. § 2-718(1). (Emphasis added.)
143. Uniform Commercial Code § 2-713, comment 1.
144. Hadley v. Ba-xendale, 9 'Welsb., H. & G. 341, 156 Eng. Rep. 145 (E*. 1354).
145. That is, a pledge securing the seller's possible damages. Petito v. Aiello, 181 Misc.
371, 47 N.Y.S.2d 447 (App. T. 1944) (per curiam).
146. N.Y. Leg. Dc. No. 66(C), p. 16 (1952).
147. Mlazzeo v. Berkley Motor Sales, 1,3 Misc. 623, 53 N.Y.S.2d 501 (App. T. 1944)
(per curiam) (no restitution of traded-in car).
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ceived no benefit from the contract, regardless of the seller's actual damages. 148
The seeming haven in the distinction between "deposit" and "part payment"
seems illusory, for, in the nature of things, even when that given by the buyer
is called a "deposit," it is clear that it is intended not to be held by the
seller as a pledge, but rather to be applied to the price, and, therefore, to
operate as a part payment14b
The amount which buyers have been allowed to retain without proof of
legal damage could hardly be termed insignificant either absolutely or percentage-wise. For example, a defaulting buyer who had made a $10,000 payment on a $53,000 contract, 150 and one who had paid fifty per cent of the
purchase price on an executory contract for the sale of furniture were not
entitled to restitution. 151
In 1952, Section 145 of the Personal Property Law was amended to entitle
the buyer "to restitution of that amount, if any, by which the payments he
has made, or the reasonable value of the goods .. ."given in part payment, or

both, exceed a reasonable liquidation damage clause or "twenty per cent of
the value of the total performance for which the buyer is obligated under the
152
contract.'
Large percentage forfeitures were thus eliminated. Left unchanged by this
"statutory liquidated damage clause,"' 58 however, was the equally harsh
forfeiture of large absolute amounts. The denial of restitution of the $10,000
part payment noted above would, therefore, still be valid. Implementation of
the doctrine of unjust enrichment'" by this amendment was clearly incomplete. Indeed, the very report of the Law Revision Commission accompanying
the amendment suggested fixing an upper limit to cure this oversight. 1 5
The Code, in providing restitution of the excess of payments over five hundred dollars or twenty per cent, whichever is smaller, has now set that upper
148. Waldman v. Greenberg, 265 App. Div. 827, 37 N.Y.S.2d 565 (2d Dep't 1942)
(memorandum decision), aff'd mem., 289 N.Y. 769, 46 N.E.2d 364 (1943); Pirman v.
Kurtz, 267 App. Div. 258, 45 N.Y.S.2d 508 (3d Dep't 1943); Lynn v. Bloom, 55 N.Y.S.2d
293 (App. T. 1945); Bisner v. Mantell, 197 Misc. 807, 95 N.Y.S.2d 793 (Rensselaer County
Ct. 1950); see Mazzeo v. Berkley Motor Sales, 183 Misc. 628, 53 N.Y.S.2d 501 (App. T.
1944) (per curiam). All these cases rely upon Lawrence v. Miller, 86 N.Y. 132 (1881), which
held that a defaulting vendee of land will be denied restitution of payment. But see
MacMurray v. City of Long Beach, 292 N.Y. 286, 54 N.E.2d 828 (1944) (peculiar contract
provision permitted application of payment to city's tax lien even if plaintiff defaulted).
149.

N.Y. Leg. Doc. No. 65(C), p. 16 (1952).

150. Waldman v. Greenberg, 265 App. Div. 827, 37 N.Y.S.2d 565 (2d Dep't 1942)
(memorandum decision), aff'd mem., 289 N.Y. 769, 46 N.E.2d 364 (1943).
151. Bisner v. Mantell, 197 Misc. 807, 95 N.Y.S.2d 793 (Rensselaer County Ct. 1950).
152. N.Y. Pers. Prop Law § 145-a(1). (Emphasis added.) This right of restitution Is
subject to certain offsets, proof of which is the burden of the seller. N.Y. Pers. Prop. Law
§ 145-a(2).
153. N.Y. Leg. Doc. No. 65(C), p. 6 (1952).
154.

Id. at 12.

155.

Id. at 14.
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limit.156 It has also effected another change implicitly suggested by the criticism
of the Law Revision Commission, of the fatuous distinction between "deposits"
and "part payments,"'157 by making the provision "applicable to any deposit or
down payment."5s
B. Contractual Modification or Limitation of Remedy
Since damages necessarily depend upon the available remedy, the Code provision allowing the parties to employ substitute remedies becomes pertinent.
Subject to the provision on liquidation and limitation of damages, the Code
remedies may be supplemented, or replaced, and the measure of damages limited
or altered by agreement. For example, the buyer's remedies may be limited to
a "return of the goods and repayment of the price or to repair and replacement of non-conforming goods or parts .

. .

."16

This is substantially in

accord with New York Personal Property Law Section 152 permitting "any
right, duty or liability [which] would arise under a contract to sell or a sale
by implication of law, [to be] . . . negatived, or varied by e.xpress agreement .. . ."160 The comments to the Code section point out, however, that

the validity of any substitute remedy depends upon its conscionability, and
in the event that it is unconscionable, that clause in the contract may be
deleted, and the Code remedies applied as if the clause never existed. 10' It
is the purpose of the Code to allow courts to pass directly on the "unconscionability" of a particular contract or clause, on the assumption that courts have
in fact done so indirectly in the past "by manipulation of the rules of offer
and acceptance or by determination that the clause is contrary to public
policy or to the dominant purpose of the contract.' 0 2 This is similar to the
present law on liquidated damages and penalties. 0 3 But, would the court
disregard a clause which the parties knew to be "unconscionable," but fully
intended to include?
156.
157.
153.

N.Y.U.C.C. § 2-718(2) (b).
N.Y. Leg. Doc. No. 65(C), pp. 15-16 (1952).
Uniform Commercial Code § 2-718, comment 2. (Emphasis added.)

159.

N.Y.U.C.C. § 2-719(1) (a).

160. N.Y. Pers. Prop. Law § 152.

161. Uniform Commercial Code § 2-719, comment 1; see N.Y.U.C.C. § 2-302(1).
162. Uniform Commercial Code § 2-302, comment 1. "The basic test is whether, in the
light of the general commercial background and the commercial nezeds of the particular
trade or case, the clauses involved are so one-sided as to be unconscionable under the
circumstances existing at the time of the making of the contrac" Ibid.
163. Liquidated damages may not be fixed at a sum entirely disproportionate to the
probable loss, Curtis v. Van Bergh, 161 N.Y. 47, 55 N.E. 393 (1S99), and courts have
"relieved parties by forced and unnatural constructions from stipulations highly penal."
Kemp v. Knickerbocker Ice Co., 69 N.Y. 45, 5S (1377). Under the Code, liquidated damages
must be "reasonable in the light of the anticipated or actual harm caused by the breach,
the difficulties of proof of loss, and the inconvenience of nonfeasibility of otherwie obtaining an adequate remedy." N.Y.U.C.C. § 2-718(1).
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Assuming, however, that the substitute remedy is not "unconscionable," the
Code provides as a rule of construction, that unless it is "expressly agreed
to be exclusive," the remedy will only be optional. 04 The comment explains
that this limitation "creates a presumption that clauses prescribing remedies
are cumulative rather than exclusive," and that if the substitute remedy is
intended to act as the sole remedy under the contract, this "must be clearly expressed."' 65 This presumption, although new to New York law, is similar to
other Code provisions presuming
cumulative rights in the absence of express
1 66
language to the contrary.
Subdivision (2) provides that "where circumstances cause an exclusive or
limited [substitute] remedy to fail of its essential purpose," the Code remedy
will be applied. 67 The comments explain that this would happen where, even
though not unconscionable, the substitute remedy, "because of circumstances
fails in its purpose or operates to deprive either party of the substantial value
of the bargain ....
,"68 For instance, in a contract where the seller warranted
that goods would be free from defects, a clause expressly stating that his
liability for nonconforming goods was limited to replacement or correction of the
defect, would normally be enforceable as an exclusive remedy under the
Code. But, it has been suggested, that if a "strike or accidental destruction of
the defective part" makes its application impracticable, then the substitute
remedy would "fail of its essential purpose," and the Code remedy would be
applied. 69 It should be noted that it is possible to construe this section to
invalidate the substitute remedy where, even though there are unforeseen circumstances, 1 70 the defects cause serious damage to the buyer. Although it
would seem in such a case that the "essential purpose" of the remedy had
been achieved, it could be argued that it operated to deprive a buyer of "the
substantial value of the bargain," and that the whole tenor of the section
was to the effect that there must be "at least a fair quantum of remedy for the
breach.'' If the "essential purpose" of the remedy is72not to be "unconscionable," such circumstances could suffice to make it fail.
Subsection (3) provides:
Consequential damages may be limited or excluded unless the limitation or exclusion
is unconscionable. Limitation of consequential damages for injury to the person in
164. N.Y.U.C.C. § 2-719(1)(b).
165. Uniform Commercial Code § 2-719, comment 2.
166. E.g., N.Y.U.C.C. §§ 2-316(2), 2-317, 2-720.
167. N.Y.U.C.C. § 2-719(2).
168. Uniform Commercial Code § 2-719, comment 1.
169. N.Y. Leg. Doc. No. 65(C), p. 250 (1955).
170. Ibid.
171. Uniform Commercial Code § 2-719, comment 1.
172. See N.Y. Leg. Doc. No. 65, p. 401 (1956), where the subsection was criticized as
"providing for disregard of the parties' agreement . . . without setting any standards. .. ."
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the case of consumer goods is prima173facie unconscionable but limitation of damages
where the loss is commercial is not.
Exclusion of consequential damages is presently allowed under New York
law. 17 4 The Code's requirement of conscionability is new, as is the imposition
of prima facie unconscionability in the case of consumer goods. Consumer
goods are defined elsewhere in the Code as goods "used or bought for use
primarily for personal, family or household purposes. . .
The primary
test is the "principal use to which the property is put," but "goods can fall
into different classes at different times." For example, a radio in the household
would be consumer goods, but the same radio in the hands of a dealer would
be commercial goods. 70 The probable basis for this distinction is that goods
used for "household purposes" are such that the seller would be on notice of
a greater possibility of personal injury to the buyer or one in his household.
Whether a clause is "unconscionable" is a question of law, and evidence as
to the "commercial setting, purpose and effect" of the clause may be presented
to aid the court in making its decision. 77 It would seem, therefore, that where
a clause limits consequential damages in a claim for personal injuries from
consumer goods, the seller must present sufficient evidence showing that the
clause is not unconscionable, or suffer all consequential damages. Where the
loss is commercial, on the other hand, the burden is on the claimant to show
that the limitation was unconscionable.
'

PART TWO: DAMAGES AS A REMEDY
FOR COMMERCIAL NEGLIGENCE
I. IEAsumns or D. A=GEs
A. Auction Sales
When there is a bulk sale of a merchant's stock in trade, 78 Article 6 requires
that notice be given by the transferee179 to the merchant's creditors. This
allows the creditors to take steps necessary to secure any interest they might
173. N.Y.U.C.C. § 2-719(3).
174. Associated Spinners, Inc. v. Massachusetts Textile Co., 75 N.Y.S.2d 263 (Sup. Ct.
1947).
175. N.Y.U.C.C. § 9-109(1).
176. Uniform Commercial Code § 9-109, comment 2.

177. N.Y.U.C.C. § 2-302(2).
17S. That type of commercial fraud dealt with by statutes controlling such a sale involves a "merchant, owing debts [who] . .. sells out his stock in trade to any one for
any price, pockets the proceeds, and disappears leaving his creditors unpaid." Uniform
Commercial Code § 6-101, comment 2(b). This coverage extends to sham sales also (Uniform
Commercial Code § 6-101, comment 1(a)), which would be difficult to arrange through the
medium of an auctioneer.

179.

N.Y.U.C.C. §§ 6-105, 6-107.
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case law in
Although this has long been part of its statutory law,
have.
New York has excluded its application to bulk sales at public auction. 182 It
was felt that the public nature of an auction sale made compliance with the
bulk sales statute unnecessary. 8 3 The New York Judicial Council has in the
past, however, tried to overturn these exclusionary decisions on the theory
that "evasions of the provisions of the Act by dishonest sellers is fortified" by
the exclusion of auction sales from its coverage.' 8 4 Finding support for this
position in the bulk sales laws of other states, 85 the Judicial Council unsuccessfully sought to amend the Bulk Sales Act to include auction sales, and make
the auctioneer responsible for compliance with its provisions. 180
Section 6-108 of the Code, bottomed upon reasoning identical to that of the
Judicial Council, 8 7 has effected the desired change.' 88 Under it, those who
direct, control, or are responsible for the auction, other than the transferor,
are collectively called "auctioneers."' 89 These parties must retain a list of
creditors' 90 required to be furnished by the transferor,' 9 ' and must prepare
and retain a schedule of property. 192 In addition, they are required to give
notice of the auction to the merchant's creditors. 9 3 Other New York statutes
obligating the auctioneer to keep records of various facets of the auction, such
as the name of the party employing him, the one for whose benefit the sale
180. Uniform Commercial Code § 6-101, comment 4 suggests the impounding of proceeds if the creditors think it necessary. The number of reported cases seems not to indicate
accurately the frequency of litigation. Mr. V. Randolph Montgomery, Counsel to the
National Association of Credit Men and the New York Credit and Financial Management
Association, was of the opinion that "there is a considerable amount of litigation." N.Y.
Leg. Doc. No. 65(E), p. 23 (1954). Mr. Wechsler. of Wechsler & Solodar, representing the
United Association of Auctioneers, said there was "a fair amount." Id. at 22.
181. N.Y. Pers. Prop. Law § 44.
182. Lowe v. Fairberg, 245 App. Div. 731, 280 N.Y. Supp. 615 (2d Dep't 1935) (memorandum decision), aff'd mem., 270 N.Y. 590, 1 N.E.2d 344 (1936). Accord, Schwartz v.
King Realty & Investment Co., 93 N.J.L. 111, 107 Atl. 154 (Sup. Ct. 1919), afl'd, 94 N.J.L.
134, 109 Atl. 567 (Ct. Err. & App. 1920).
183. Ibid.; Merchants Refrigerating Co. v. Benjamin Titman Corp., 20 N.Y.S.2d 280
(Sup. Ct.), aff'd mem., 260 App. Div. 919, 24 N.Y.S.2d 303 (1st Dep't 1940), aff'd mem.,
285 N.Y. 663, 34 N.E.2d 374 (1941); Wolfe v. Bellfair Hat Co., 47 N.Y.S.2d 908 (Sup. Ct.
1944); N.Y. Leg. Doc. No. 65(G), p. 31 (1955).
184. Eighth Annual Report of the Judicial Council of the State of New York, N.Y.
Leg. Doc. No. 16, p. 399 (1942) ; Sixth Annual Report of the Judicial Council of the State
of New York, N.Y. Leg. Doc. No. 48, p. 374 (1940).
185. N.Y. Leg. Doc. No. 16, p. 399 (1942).
186. Id. at 399-400.
187. Uniform Commercial Code § 6-108, comment 1.
188. Ibid.
189. N.Y.U.C.C. § 6-108(3).
190. N.Y.U.C.C. § 6-108(3)(a).
191. N.Y.U.C.C. § 6-108(2).
192. N.Y.U.C.C. § 6-108(3)(a).
193. N.Y.U.C.C. § 6-108(3)(b).
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is to be made, distinguishing marks, if any, on the goods and so forth, have
been amended to stipulate that such duties are in addition to those prescribed
by the Code.' 94
While the auctioneer's failure to fulfill the requirement of notice to the
merchant's creditors, or any other Code requirement, does not affect the
validity of the sale or the title of the purchasers,"35
if the auctioneer knows that the auction constitutes a bulk transfer such failure
renders the auctioneer liable to the creditors of the transferor as a class for tho
sums owing to themn frorn the transferor up to but not exceeding the 71et procecds of
the auction.'9
This sanction for noncompliance is unique within the article on Bulk Transfers.
The requirement that the auctioneer have knowledge that the auction is to
be in the nature of a bulk sale recognizes that he may sometimes not be aware
of this fact, 97 as in a simple consignment for sale, and in such circumstances
no liability can be imposed.' 98
Typical of a more rigorous approach was Pennsylvania's Bulk Sales Law,'92
which specifically held auctioneers liable to creditors for noncompliance with
its provisions to the extent of the fair value of the property sold.2 0 No proviso exempted auctioneers from liability when ignorant of the fact that the
nature of the sale was one in bulk. Present California law goes even further in
providing that an auctioneer's dereliction of his duty to record and publish
notice20' of an upcoming sale at auction of the stock in trade of, among others,
a retail or wholesale merchant, is conclusively deemed fraudulent and will
render him liable to any creditor of the transferor for all damages incurrred1 2
The tenor of these provisions was not immediately ameliorated by the early
draft of the Commercial Code adopted in Pennsylvania. 2 3 Later, however,
because of criticism -04 of the imposition of liability without an opportunity
to avoid it, a relaxation was effected both in the Uniform Code draft itselfi 194. N.Y. Gen. Bus. Law § 25.

195. N.Y.U.C.C. § 6-103(4).
196. N.Y.U.C.C. § 6-103(4). (Emphasis added.)

197. The draftsman of article 6 admitted that this point had not occurred to him, and
sanctioned the proviso. Stenographic Report of Hearing on Article 6 of the Uniform Commercial Code, N.Y. Leg. Doc. No. 65(E), p. 28 (1954).
198. Uniform Commercial Code § 6-10S, comment 2.
199. Pa. Laws 1919, ch. 262, §§ 1-3; Pa. Laws 1927, ch. 879, No. 446, § 1.
200. Pa. Laws 1919, ch. 262, § 3.
201. It has been suggested that a pro%ision similar to Californias, allowing the recording of notice of an impending auction sale, would be useful. N.Y. Leg. Doc. No. 16, p. 393-09
(1942).
202. Cal. Civ. Code § 3440.1.
203. Pa. Stat. Ann. tit. 12A, § 6-10S, adopted April 6, 1953.
204. See Hawkland, Amending the Uniform Commercial Code--A Report on Valid
Criticism and Suggested Change In re Articles 1, 2 and 6, 28 Temp. L.Q. 512 (1955).
205. Supplement No. 1 to the 1952 Official Draft of Text and Comments of the Uniform
Commercial Code, p. 39 (1955).
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and by amendment in Pennsylvania,200 by inserting the present requisite for
knowledge of the nature of the sale on the part of the auctioneer.
Considering the extreme positions in California and Pennsylvania, and the
complete void in present New York law, the instant provision appears to be
the fairest compromise. The detailed objections lodged against the earlier and
more stringent draft provisions relating to auction sales20 7 by the representative of the United Association of Auctioneers208 serve only to reinforce this
conclusion. These objections were threefold: that section 6-108 imposes liability
irrespective of the auctioneer's ignorance that the sale is actually one in
bulk; 20 9 that section 6-106, as applied to auction sales by section 6-108,
obligating the transferee to assure the application of the proceeds of the sale
to the creditors of the transferor, is unreasonably vexatious;210 and, that
the definition of "creditors" in section 6-109 is too broad, and would make
an auctioneer liable even to contingent creditors such as those with tort
claims against the transferor, or holders of notes guaranteed by the trans211
feror.
As has been indicated, the first objection has had its desired effect, in that
the auctioneer can now be liable only when he is aware of the bulk nature of
the sale. The second objected to a provision that was proposed by the Code
draftsman as optional, 212 and has not been adopted in New York. 218 The last
objection, however, relating to the definition of "creditor" in section 6-109,
has not achieved the sought-after correction, 214 for the form objected to has
been adopted in New York, and the testimony of its draftsman establishes
that contingent creditors are definitely within its purview, 21r seemingly to
insure the fullest protection.
Assuming that auctioneers would prefer no liability at all,21 0 the duties
206. Pennsylvania subsequently amended its statute. Pa. Stat. Ann. tit. 12A, § 6-108
(Supp. 1962).
207. See Uniform Commercial Code § 6-108 (1952).
208. The United Association of Auctioneers was represented at the hearings of the New
York Law Revision Commission by Wechsler & Solodar who submitted a memorandum on
behalf of the Association. N.Y. Leg. Doc. No. 65(E), p. 8 (1954).
209. Id. at 11.
210.

Id. at 12-14.

211. Id.at 12-13.
212. See note following Uniform Commercial Code § 6-106.
213. Uniform Commercial Code §§ 6-106, 6-108(3) (c) were omitted from the New York
bills. State of New York Commission on Uniform State Laws, Supplementary Report on
Uniform Commercial Code 12 (1962). The burden imposed by such provisions has long
been considered too great by New York. Sixth Annual Report of the Judicial Council of
the State of New York, N.Y. Leg. Doc. No. 48, pp. 383-91 (1940).
214. N.Y. Sess. Laws 1962, ch. 553 (eff. Sept. 27, 1964) enacted the objected-to
provision. See note 211 supra and accompanying text.
215. Stenographic Report of Hearing on Article 6 of the Uniform Commercial Code,
N.Y. Leg. Doc. No. 65(E), p. 25 (1954).
216. Id. at 18-22.
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imposed by the Code could hardly be termed onerous in view of those previously
indicated relating to the sale and the parties thereto.217
The actual measure of damages for which the auctioneer will now be liable
seems not to have been in issue, for the alternate rule proposed by the United
Association of Auctioneers included retaining "that portion of the proceeds
limited to the transferor's indebtedness for at least ten days before delivering
same. . ." to the transferor. 21 8 Taking the "proceeds" here to be net, the
amount would be the same as prescribed by the Code.2 19
B. Effect of an Overissue
As a general rule, the Code will validate defective securities in the hands
of innocent purchasers.22 0 It will not, however, validate or compel the issue
or reissue of a security where an overissue would result 22* 1 Overissue is defined
as "the issue of securities in excess of the amount which the issuer has corporate power to issue."2 222 It has been noted that this definition excludes bonds,
and, therefore, does not "perpetuate the present cumbersome practice of issuing
a 'certificate of indebtedness' because the indenture limit of the bond issue has
been reached."22 3 There is some question, however, whether the section
should include bonds issued by a municipality in excess of its "corporate power
to issue." 224 The term "corporate power" would seem clearly to mean "charter
power." Nevertheless, the words have been criticized as ambiguous, as well
they might be, for instance, in a case where a public utility issues securities in
excess of its regulatory authorization, but not beyond its charter power. - 2
The Code, then, is in accord with the common-law view that certificates
calling for stock in excess of a corporation's authorized capital are wholly
7z
Nor can a corporation be
void,22 6 and cannot be validated by the courts.
217.
218.
219.

See note 194 supra and accompanying text.
See N.Y. Leg. Doc. No. 65(E), p. 12 (1954).
See note 196 supra and accompanying text.

220. See, e.g., N.Y.U.C.C. §§ 8-202(2), 8-205, 8-206(1), 8-203, 8-311, 8-404, 8-405.
221. N.Y.U.C.C. § 8-104(1).
222. N.Y.U.C.C. § S-104(2).
223. N.Y. Leg. Doc. No. 65(G), p. 65 (1954); but see id. at 5, 11.
224. Under § 8-202(2), a security of a governmental unit issued with "a defect going
to its validity" is validated in the hands of an innocent purchaser for value when "a stated
purpose of the issue is one for which the issuer has power to borrow money or issue the
security." Uniform Commercial Code § 3-202, comment 5, however, explains that an over-

issued security is excepted from this rule, and that the holder is left with his remedy in
damages under § 8-104.
225. N.Y. Leg. Doc. No. 65(G), p. 90 (1954); cf. N.Y. Pub. Serv. Law § 55.
226.

Bruff v. Mali, 36 N.Y. 200 (1867); New York & N.H.R.R. v. Schuyler, 34 N.Y.

30 (1865); Mechanics' Bank v. New York & N.H.R.R., 13 N.Y. 599 (1856).
227. People ex rel. Jenkins v. Parker Vein Coal Co., 10 How. Pr. 543 (N.Y. Sup. Ct.

1854).
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compelled to issue spurious stock. 228 What rights, then, does the holder of
these defective securities acquire?
At common law the issuer was liable in damages, 229 but since the measure
of damages seemed to vary depending on the form of action and the facts in
each case, no single measure had been fixed. 23 0 The Code is designed to set a
measure which will compensate
the holder and reduce the possibility of
23
speculation by the purchaser. '
Early in the history of this section, attempts were made to draft a provision
which would require the issuer to amend its charter to increase its authorized
capitalization and make the spurious certificates valid.23 2 Although this solution seems just, it was rejected, apparently because it would amount to forcing
23
shareholders to perform an act which under the statute was only voluntary. 3
The Code, as passed, provides that if securities identical to those called
for in the spurious certificates are "reasonably available for purchase," the
holder "may compel" the issuer to purchase and deliver them to him. 23 4 The
comments say that such securities would be so available if "traded on an
organized market, or because one or more holders may be willing to sell at a
not unreasonable price. .... ,,235 On the other hand, what if the issuer has no
power to buy its own stock? There are no provisions in New York allowing the
228. New York & N.H.R.R. v. Schuyler, 34 N.Y. 30 (1865); Selwyn-Brown v. Superno
Co., 181 App. Div. 420, 168 N.Y. Supp. 918 (1st Dep't 1918).
229. New York & N.H.R.R. v. Schuyler, supra note 228.
230. New York courts have applied differing measures: Mohr v. J. C. Penney Co., 242
App. Div. 385, 276 N.Y. Supp. 50 (1st Dep't 1934), aff'd mem., 270 N.Y. 606, 1 N.E.2d
352 (1936) (value on the date of wrongful transfer) ; Baker v. Drake, 53 N.Y. 211 (1873)
(highest market value within a reasonable time after notice of the wrongful act) ; New York
& N.H.R.R. v. Schuyler, 34 N.Y. 30 (1895) (where the certificates have been pledged-the
amount of the debt due the pledgee); Commercial Bank v. Kortright, 22 Wend. 348 (N.Y.
Ct. Err. 1839) (highest value between the refusal to transfer and the commencement of suit).
Some measures adopted by other states are: Leffingwell v. Evans, 185 Ky. 351, 216 S.W. 58
(1919) (damages depend upon the amount paid in dividends, and the value when purchased
by plaintiff); Allen v. South Boston R.R., 150 Mass. 200, 22 N.E. 917 (1889) (value at time
of refusal to recognize certificates) ; Douglas v. Merceles, 25 N.J. Eq. 144 (Ch. 1874) (market
value on or about the time the cause of action arose).
231. Uniform Commercial Code § 8-104, comment 3.
232. Israels, Article 8-Investment Securities, 16 Law & Contemp. Prob. 249, 254-55
(1951). Israels thinks that this solution is more realistic than the present Code provision,
which maintains the "'sacrosanct character of overissue.'" Ibid. See Note to Proposed Final
Draft No. 1, April 26, 1948.
233. N.Y. Bus. Corp. Law §§ 803-04 (eff. Sept. 1, 1963). Isracls points to the
Public Utility Holding Company Act of 1935, 49 Stat. 803, 15 U.S.C. § 79 (1958), under
which the Securities Exchange Commission can require recapitalization of a regulated
utility without shareholder approval, 16 Law & Contemp. Prob. at 255.
234. N.Y.U.C.C. § 8-104(1) (a).
235. Uniform Commercial Code § 8-104, comment 2.
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issuer to purchase its shares out of stated capital in such a case,2O New York
law limits the issuer to purchasing out of surplus and only if the corporation
is not then, nor would thereby be made, insolvent2 37 If the issuer does not
meet these requirements, or if it has no surplus, could it be compelled to purchase an identical security, readily available on the market, under the Code?
It most probably could not,23 8 and the holder's remedy would only be for
damages. It has been suggested, and perhaps correctly so, that if the word
"purchase" were construed to include past purchases, the issuer could deliver
treasury shares.239 Perhaps, as an alternative, the shareholders could be
persuaded to authorize an additional issue, 1 0 though it is certain that they

could not be compelled to do

so.241

Subsection (1) (a) has been criticized on two grounds. The holder is not
compensated for any loss of interest or dividends sustained between the time
of purchase and receipt of substitute securities. Moreover, he is deprived of an
opportunity to sell the securities in a falling market to avoid further loss. 2In the case where an identical security is not reasonably available for
purchase, subsection (1) (b) provides that the holder "may recover from the
issuer the price he or the last purchaser for value paid for it with interest from
the date of his demand." 243 Neither does this subsection compensate for lost
dividends or interest, nor if the market has risen, is the holder compensated
for any profit he has lost because of his inability to sell. 4
If an identical security is reasonably available for purchase on the market,
the holder could not recover damages under subsection (1) (b).2 4 0 Must he,
however, accept an identical security? Subsection (1) (a) says that the holder
"may compel" the issuer to purchase and deliver the security, but it does not
say he mwst do so. Is some other remedy, not provided for in the Code, avail236.

N.Y. Bus. Corp. Law 513(b), allows a corporation to purchase its own shares out

of stated capital, but only if the purchase is made for one of four stated purposes. None
of these purposes suggests a situation similar to that presented by subsection (1)(a). The
instant section of the Code is effective September 27, 1964, so only the Business Corporation Law vill then be in effect.
237. N.Y. Bus. Corp. Law § 513(a).
238. Ibid. Under N.Y. Pen. Law § 664(5) directors can be guilty of a misdemeanor for
applying "any portion of the funds of such corporation, except surplus, directly or indirectly,
to the purchase of shares of its own stock, except as provided or permitted by law." It
seems clear that a purchase under the Code provision, if allowed under the Businezs Corporation Law, would be permitted by law.
239. N.Y. Leg. Doc. No. 65(I), p. 25 (1955). "Purchase' is defined in N.Y.U.C.C.
§ 1-201(32).
240. See Israels, supra note 232, at 255.
241. See note 233 supra and accompanying text.
242. N.Y. Leg. Doc. No. 65(A), p. 453 (1956).

243. N.Y.U.C.C. § S-104(I)(b).
244. See N.Y. Leg. Doc. No. 65(A), p. 453 (1956).
245. This subsection is only applicable "if a security is not so available for purchase. . . ." N.Y.U.C.C. § 8-104(1) (b).
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able to him? Suppose the issuer persuades the shareholders to authorize an
additional issue, must the holder accept it? The section is certainly ambiguous
on these points. The comments, however, explain that "the plaintiff is limited
to the two alternate remedies .... "246 Therefore, it would be most logical to
assume that "may compel" in subsection (1) (a) will be construed as meaning
''must compel."
C. Bank's Liability to Customer for Wrongful Dishonor
Under New York's common law, 247 a bank is liable to a depositor for the
wrongful dishonor, be it mistaken 248 or intentional, 249 of a check. This liability
arises from the bank's contractual obligation (express or implied) to hold
and pay out the depositor's funds according to his order.2 5 0 Recovery has
also been had in negligence, 251 or even in defamation, for it has been held that
where a bank returns a check drawn on a fiduciary's account marked "short"
or "insufficient funds," such a notation imports "a charge of dishonesty or
breach of trust. .... ,,252 In the absence of special damages, pleaded and proved,
the depositor could not recover more than nominal damages for a mistaken
dishonor. 253 Where special damages are alleged, however, recovery would be
allowed for all actual 254 or substantial 2rr damages proved. The latter are also
246. Uniform Commercial Code § 8-104, comment 1.
247. Although statutory provisions similar to N.Y.U.C.C. § 4-402 are in force In twentythree states, New York, at present, has no such statute. N.Y. Leg. Doc. No. 65(E), p. 264
(1955).
248. T. B. Clark Co. v. Mount Morris Bank, 85 App. Div. 362, 83 N.Y. Supp. 447
(1st Dep't 1903).
249. Wildenberger v. Ridgewood Natl Bank, 230 N.Y. 425, 130 N.E. 600 (1921).
250. Burroughs v. Tradesmen's Nat'l Bank, 87 Hun 6, 33 N.Y. Supp. 864 (Sup. Ct. 1895),
aff'd mer., 156 N.Y. 663, 50 N.E. 1115 (1898); Citizens' Nat'l Bank v. Importers & Traders'
Bank, 119 N.Y. 195, 23 N.E. 540 (1890).
251. Davis v. Standard Nat'l Bank, 50 App. Div. 210, 63 N.Y. Supp. 764 (1st Dep't
1900).
252. Nealis v. Industrial Bank of Commerce, 200 Misc. 406, 407, 107 N.Y.S.2d 264, 265
(Sup. Ct. 1951).
253. T. B. Clark Co. v. Mount Morris Bank, 85 App. Div. 362, 83 N.Y. Supp. 447 (1st
Dep't 1903). In dictum in Wildenberger v. Ridgewood Nat'l Bank, 230 N.Y. 425, 427-28,
130 N.E. 600 (1921), it was said that "the liability is for nominal damages and no more,
if the dishonor . . . is the result of innocent mistake." Although this rule has often been
cited with approval, e.g., Gonzales v. Colonial Trust Co., 7 Misc. 2d 508, 509, 162 N.Y.S.2d
754, 755 (Sup. Ct. 1957), lower court decisions show that it is only applied in the absence of
special damages. See Nealis v. Industrial Bank of Commerce, supra note 252; Katz v. Pacific
Bank, 212 App. Div. 601, 209 N.Y. Supp. 497 (1st Dep't 1925); see generally 1 Clark,
Damages § 195 (1925).
254. Schein v. Public Bank, 101 Misc. 499, 167 N.Y. Supp. 394 (App. T. 1917); Levine
v. State Bank, 80 Misc. 524, 141 N.Y. Supp. 596 (Sup. Ct. 1913).
255. Meyer v. Hudson Trust Co., 181 App. Div. 69, 168 N.Y. Supp. 387 (1st Dep't 1917)
(remanded to give plaintiff chance to prove facts entitling him to recover substantial
damages).
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recoverable even in the absence of special damages, where the dishonored
check was to be used in a business transaction,20 or where a fiduciary brings
27
an action for defamation.

3

Since the Code does not deal with intentionaF s dishonor, by implication,
the bank's greater liability therefor 2'5 will be treated by the courts as un26
changed.
The Code provides that when an item 0 ' is dishonored - 2 by mistake, the
payor bank's26 3 liability "is limited to actual damages proved," 264 and, therefore, nominal damages can no longer G5 be awarded.2 c0 Similarly, the rule that
a fiduciary could recover substantial damages for defamation, c7 without actual
206
damages, is no longer the law.
Authorities differ on whether an arrest or prosecution - 3 of the drawer
could be the proximate result of a mistaken dishonor. 2 0 While no case in
256. See note 275 infra and accompanying text.
257. Nealis v. Industrial Bank of Commerce, 200 Misc. 405, 107 N.Y.S.2d 264 (Sup. Ct.
1951).

258. W1henever the wrongful act is done intentionally, "a legal inference of malice
arises.... " Davis v. Standard Nat'I Bank, 50 App. Div. 210, 213, 63 N.Y. Supp. 764, 766
(1st Dep't 1900). "This does not mean... it must be the product of hatred or malevolence.
It is the exclusion of liability for the consequences of accident or mistake.... " Wildenberger
v. Ridgewood Nat'l Bank, 230 N.Y. 425, 428, 130 N.E. 600 (1921). The court in Davis
pointed out, however, that when the act is repeated, a jury may infer that it was done
intentionally. Daxis v. Standard Nat'l Bank, supra, at 213, 63 N.Y. Supp. at 763.
259. See Wildenberger v. Ridgewood Nat'l Bank, supra note 258; Wahrman v. Bronx
County Trust Co., 246 App. Div. 220, 235 N.Y. Supp. 312 (1st Dep't 1936); Davis v.
Standard Nat'l Bank, supra note 253.
260. Insofar as the cases of wilful dishonor are concerned, § 4-402 neither codifies nor
changes the law of the cases. N.Y. Leg. Doc. No. 65(E), p. 274 (1955).
261. The Commercial Code defines "item" as "any instrument for the payment of money
even though it is not negotiable but does not include money. .. ." N.Y.U.C.C. § 4-104.
262. "'Wrongful dishonor' excludes any permitted or justified dishonor, as where the
drawer has no credit extended by the drawee, or where the draft lacks a necessary indorzement or is not properly presented." Uniform Commercial Code § 4-402, comment 2.
263. The Commercial Code defines "payor bank" as "a bank by which an item is
payable as drawn or accepted. . . 2" N.Y.U.C.C. § 4-105.
264. N.Y.U.C.C. § 4-402. (Emphasis added.)
265. See note 253 supra and accompanying text.
266. See N.Y. Leg. Doc. No. 65(E), p. 274 (1955).
267. See notes 6 & 11 supra and accompanying text.
263. "The merchant, trader and fiduciary are placed on the same footing as any other
drawer and in all cases of dishonor by mistake damages recoverable are limited to those
actually proved." Uniform Commercial Code § 4-402, comment 3; see N.Y. Leg. Doc. No.
65(C), pp. 299-300 (1954).
269. N.Y. Pen. Law § 1292-a.
270. Too remote: Hartford v. All Night & Day Bank, 170 Cal. 538, 150 Pac. 356 (1915);
Waggoner v. State Bank, 220 Mo. App. 165, 231 SAV. 130 (1925). Contra, Collins v. City
Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 131 Conn. 167, 38 A.2d 582 (1944).
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New York has directly considered this issue, dictum in a lower court decision
approved the view that such damages would be too remote as a matter of
law. 271 The Code expressly states that this question is within the purview of
272
the trier of fact.
When the dishonor is of a trader's check, 273 New York courts will allow
the trier of fact to infer "some injury to credit, ' 274 and even in the absence of
special damage, award substantial damages. 275 While the Code is not explicit on this point, the comment to this section declares that its purpose is
to remove any distinction between a trader and nontrader, and thereby reject
decisions allowing substantial damages to a trader, "without proof that dam27 6
age has occurred."
II. LIMITATIONS ON DAMAGES
A. Bank's Variation of Liability by Agreement
At common law, a bank was liable for its failure to exercise ordinary care
in handling an item to the extent of the holder or payee's actual loss.277 The

bank could limit this liability in a specific transaction, but only where the
customer had clearly assented to the limitation.2 7 8 Absent such a limitation,
271. Robbins v. Bankers Trust Co., 4 Misc. 2d 347, 351, 157 N.Y.S.2d 56, 60 (Sup. Ct.
1956) (dictum).
272. N.Y.U.C.C. § 4-402. See Uniform Commercial Code § 4-402, comment 5.
273. New York cases have not clearly defined what a "trader" is. Other courts, however,
have defined "trader" to include any businessman. Gendler v. Sibley State Bank, 62 F. Supp.
805, 811 (N.D. Iowa 1945). New York seems to apply the same rules in the case where a
check is to be used in a business transaction even when the maker is not a trader. In
Meyers v. Hudson Trust Co., 181 App. Div. 69, 168 N.Y. Supp. 387 (1st Dep't 1917), there
was no indication that plaintiff was a trader, or that the dishonor was wilful, but the
check was to be used in a business transaction.
274. Wildenberger v. Ridgewood Nat'l Bank, 230 N.Y. 425, 429, 130 N.E. 600, 601
(1921).
275. Katz v. Pacific Bank, 212 App. Div. 601, 605, 209 N.Y. Supp. 497, 500-01 (1st
Dep't 1925) (by implication); Meyers v. Hudson Trust Co., 181 App. Div. 69, 168 N.Y.
Supp. 387 (1st Dep't 1917) (by implication). The court in Katz v. Pacific Bank, supra,
quoted with approval Wiley v. Bunker Hill Nat'l Bank, 183 Mass. 495, 496, 67 N.E. 655,
656 (1903): "In the case of a trader, injury to his credit may be inferred from the fact
that he is a trader, and substantial damages may be found and given upon proof of that
fact without anything more." Katz v. Pacific Bank, supra, at 606, 209 N.Y. Supp. at 501.
Also quoted with approval was Third Nat'l Bank v. Ober, 178 Fed. 678, 679 (8th Cir.
1910): "If the depositor is a merchant or trader, it will be presumed, without further proof,
that substantial damages have been sustained." Katz v. Pacific Bank, supra, at 606, 209
N.Y. Supp. at 501.
276. Uniform Commercial Code § 4-402, comment 3.
277. First Nat'l Bank v. Fourth Nat'l Bank, 77 N.Y. 320, 328 (1879); see Bown Bros.
v. Merchants Bank, 243 N.Y. 366, 153 N.E. 493 (1926).
278. Gaita v. Windsor Bank, 251 N.Y. 152, 154-55, 167 N.E. 203, 204 (1929). S. & M.
Allen v. Merchants Bank, 22 Wend. 215 (N.Y. Ct. Err. 1839) is the first statement of tills
rule. It upheld a limitation on a specific transaction based either on contract or usage. The
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where the bank's lack of due care resulted in some loss to the holder, such as
an indorser, or other party to the instrument, being released from liabilityi3 -9
the damages were prima facie the face value of the note. 30 It could be shown,
however, that the holder's actual loss was less.2 ' For example, if the parties
to the instrument were insolvent,2-8 2 or if, in fact some party to the instrument
was solvent and the instrument had been returned
to the holder, the bank's
283
lack of care would not have caused a loss.
Where the bank's action is in bad faith, New York cases indicate that recovery might lie in conversion,2 - 4 and that all proximate damages would be
chargeable to the bank.2The Code provides that the rules of the article governing bank deposits and
collections may be varied by agreement (express or implied), except that no
agreement may "disclaim a bank's responsibility for its own lack of good

faith or failure to exercise ordinary care or can limit the micasure of damages
for such lack or failure ....
2S0 Subsection (5) prescribes the measure of
such damages as the amount of the item less what could not have been realized
by use of ordinary care.23 7 Where the bank acts in bad faith, however, all
proximate damages are recoverable. 2 18 This is in accordance with the commonlaw rule, except that the Code provides for a special rule of damages where
the bank has converted a negotiable instrument. In such a case, the drawee is
liable for the face amount of the instrument, and
evidence is not admissible
2- 9
to show that the instrument is in fact worthless. 1
New York Negotiable Instruments Law prescribes precisely the duties of the collecting or
payee bank in paying an item, but provides that the effect of the section "may be varied by
agreement.' N.Y. Negotiable Instr. Law § 350-b(4). See generally N.Y. Leg. Doc. No. 65(E),
pp. 4S-51 (1955); Note, 27 Colum. L. Rev. 294 (1927).
279. National Revere Bank v. National Bank, 172 N.Y. 102, 64 N.E. 799 (1902); Firt
Nat'l Bank v. Fourth Natl Bank, S9 N.Y. 412 (1SS2) (sccond appeal); Coghlan v.
Dinsmore, 9 Bosw. 453 (N.Y. Super. Ct. 1862), aff'd, 1 Abb. App. Dc. 375, 35 How. Pr.
416 (N.Y. 1867).
280. First Nat'l Bank v. Fourth Nat'l Bank, 77 N.Y. 320, 323 (1379) (dictum); Potter
v. Merchants' Bank, 2S N.Y. 641 (1864); Bridge -.. Mason, 45 Barb. 37 (N.Y. Sup. CLt
lS65).
281. First Nat'l Bank v. Fourth Nat'l Bank, supra note 2S0, at 329-30.
282. National Revere Bank v. National Bank, 172 N.Y. 102, 109, 64 N.E. 799, S01 (1902)
(dictum).
283. First Nat'l Bank v. Fourth Nat'l Bank, 77 N.Y. 320, 330 (1879); see Hoivard v.
Bank of Metropolis, 95 App. Div. 342, 346, S8 N.Y. Supp. 1070, 1073 (1st Dep't 1914)
(dictum).
284. Stark v. Public Natl Bank, 123 Misc. 647, 650, 205 N.Y. Supp. 3, 12 (Sup. CL
1924) (dictum).
285. Ayrault v. Pacific Bank, 1 Abb. Pr. (us.) 3S1, 384 (N.Y. Super. Ct. 1863) (dictum),
afl'd, 47 N.Y. 570 (1872).
2S6. N.Y.U.C.C. § 4-103(1). (Emphasis added.)
287. N.Y.U.C.C. § 4-103(5).
28S. Ibid.
289. N.Y.U.C.C. § 3-419.
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Apart from its prohibition against limitations of the bank's liability for
failure to exercise due care, the Code has effected no substantial change in the
law. It merely simplifies the terminology used by the courts. The common-law
rule made the measure of damages (when some loss exists) the actual loss,
which in turn was prima facie the value of the instrument less the amount
which would not have been realized by the use of due care. The Code drops
the superfluous middle term "actual loss," while maintaining the requisite that
the measure be inoperative unless some loss to the owner or customer is
provision
established. 290 The necessity for a showing of loss under the Code
291
leaves undisturbed the common-law allowance of nominal damages.
B. Limitation of Warehouseman's Liability
The law governing the liability of warehousemen for the care of goods
stored was previously well settled in New York.292 New York General Business Law Article 9,293 which will be supplanted by Article 7 of the Code, " 4
provides that the warehousemen's failure to exercise "such care ... as a reasonably careful owner ... would exercise . . ." would subject him to liability for
any loss or injury caused thereby.2'5 Furthermore, no receipt he might issue
for such goods could impair his obligation to exercise that degree of care.220" 07
This did not mean, however, that he could not contract to limit his liability
as long as the standard of care was not impaired. 298 An explicit contractual
290. Although the wording of the subsection does seem to leave some doubt as to
whether any actual loss to the depositor is essential, see N.Y. Leg. Doe. No. 65(E), pp.
52-53 (1955). This ambiguity is clearly resolved in the comments to the section: "Of course,
it continues to be as necessary under subsection (5) as it has been under ordinary common
law principles that, before the damage rule of the subsection becomes operative, liability
of the bank and some loss to the customer or owner must be established." Uniform Commercial Code § 4-103, comment 6.
291. Since the subsection is not operative until some loss is shown, note 290 supra, it
could not be held to prohibit a recovery of nominal damages. These are still recoverable,
therefore, where the defendant is able to show the absence of actual loss. Howard v. Bank
of Metropolis, 95 App. Div. 342, 345, 88 N.Y. Supp. 1070, 1072 (Ist Dep't 1904) and
authorities cited therein; S. & M. Allen v. Suydem, 20 Wend. 321 (N.Y. Ct. Err. 1838).
292. Uniform Commercial Code § 7-204, comment 1, speaks of confusion in some jurisdictions as to the possibility of limiting this liability. These seems to be no such confusion
in New York. See notes 297-302 infra and accompanying text.
293. N.Y. Gen. Bus. Law §§ 90-143.
294. This article also repeals the Uniform Bills of Lading Act, adopted in New York
Sess. Laws 1911, ch. 248, and presently contained in N.Y. Pers. Prop. Law §§ 187-241. See
schedule of laws repealed, N.Y. Sess. Laws 1962, ch. 553 (eff. Sept. 27, 1964).
295. N.Y. Gen. Bus. Law § 107.
296. N.Y. Gen. Bus. Law § 91.
297. Tewes v. North German Lloyd S.S. Co., 186 N.Y. 151, 78 N.E. 864 (1906).
298. Adler v. Bush Terminal Co., 161 Misc. 509, 291 N.Y. Supp. 435 (Sup. Ct. 1936),
aff'd mem., 250 App. Div. 730, 294 N.Y. Supp. 726 (2d Dep't 1937).
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limitation, "z1 clearly assented to by the bailor, 3'10 i.c., not imposed unilaterally
by the warehouseman, 301 3was effective in limiting his liability for negligence,' -2
but not for conversion.29
Generally, section 7-204(1) restates the rule of liability established by
Section 107 of the New York General Business Law. Two changes of language,
however, should be noted. First, the standard of care of "a reasonably careful man, '3°4 has replaced that of the "reasonably careful owner."z;95 This
substitution30 7would seem to effect no change in substance.2AO Second, the words
"any loss"- have been replaced by "damages for loss of." :z This was done
at the urging of those claiming that the former terminology could foster a
common-law trend towards the imposition of an insurer's liability upon the
warehouseman: 0 9 This is a spurious rationale, however, for the very words
objected to have always been part of the General Business Law.3 10 There they
were modified by the same exception adopted by the Code,31' namely that,
in the absence of a contrary agreement, no liability would ensue where due
care could not have prevented the loss.31 2 New York case law has also uniformly denied that the warehouseman's liability was that of an insurer. 3 It
299. Abend v. Haberman, 281 App. Div. 262, 119 N.Y.S.2d 48S (1st Dep't 1953). The
limitation must be "absolutely clear in its intent and purpose." Id. at 264, 119 N.Y.S.2d at
491. It must precisely state that the limitation extends to negligence or other fault. Howard
v. Handler Bros. & Winell, Inc., 279 App. Div. 72, 107 N.Y.S.2d 749 (lst Dep't 1951), aff'd
mem., 303 N.Y. 990, 106 N.E.2d 67 (1952). See, e.g., Daniel v. United Security A_--odated
Warehouses, Inc., S6 N.Y.S.2d 236 (App. T. 1949) ($50 limitation per article vas enforced).
300. Kar v. H. & M. Parcel Room, Inc., 270 App. Div. 538, 61 N.Y.S.2d 285 (1st Dzpl
1946), aff'd mem, 296 N.Y. 1044, 73 N.E.2d 912 (1947).
301. E.g., by sending a receipt to the bailor containing the limitation. Belzer v. Daub
Storage Warehouse & Van Co., 130 N.Y. Supp. 153 (App. T. 1911).
302. Boyle v. Bush Terminal R.R., 210 N.Y. 3S9, 104 N.E. 933 (1914). A sharp distinction is drawn in the cases between the relation of converion and that of negligence to
limitations of liability. See D'Utassy v. Barrett, 219 N.Y. 420, 424, 114 N.E. 726, 787 (1916)
(dictum).
303. Glinsky v. Dunham & Reid, Inc., 230 App. Div. 470, 245 N.Y. Supp. 359 (Ist Dep't
1930); Kaplan Prods. & Textiles, Inc. v. Chelsea Fireproof Storage Warehouse, Inc., 9
Misc. 2d 273, 163 N.Y.S.2d 705 (App. T. 1957).
304. N.Y.U.C.C. § 7-204(1).
305. N.Y. Gen. Bus. Law § 107.
306. N.Y. Leg. Doc. No. 65(H), p. 32 (1955).
307. N.Y. Gen. Bus. Law § 107.
308. N.Y.U.C.C. § 7-204(1).
309. 1956 Recommendations of the Editorial Board for the Uniform Commercial Code
199.
310. Uniform Warehouse Receipts Act § 21.
311. N.Y.U.C.C. § 7-204(1).

312. N.Y. Gen. Bus. Law § 107.
313. Claflin v. Meyer, 75 N.Y. 260 (1878) (negligence must be shown); Verdnigte
Aluminium-Werke Aktiengesellschaft v. Atlantic Tidewater Terminals, 137 Misc. 160, 241
N.Y. Supp. 597 (Sup. Ct. 1930) (Uniform Warehouse Receipts Act w-as not mentioned
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must be concluded, therefore, that section 7-204(1), in toto, represents only a
314
slight rewording of prior New York law.
Section 7-204(2), on the other hand, presents a difficult problem. It expressly
adopts the position of the New York courts towards limiting the warehouseman's liability, 315 and recognizes that the wording of the present statute resulted in many differing interpretations in other jurisdictions. 810 However, it
then adds a troublesome proviso affecting the liability as limited:
[S]uch liability may on written request of the bailor at the time of signing [the] ...
storage agreement or within a reasonable time after receipt of the warehouse receipt
be increased . . . [but not if] contrary to a lawful limitation . . . in the warehouse7
31
man's tariff, if any.

The New York Law Revision Commission understood this provision as attempting to preclude the warehouseman from giving a bailor the choice of
either accepting a valuation imposed arbitrarily and unilaterally by the warehouseman, or not dealing with him at all. 318 This is a valid conclusion in
light of the obvious intention of the provision, namely to allow a contractual
adjustment of liability, while withholding from the warehouseman a license to
impose self-serving limitations of liability. The Law Revision Commission
Report states that, in its opinion, the provision operates only where no duty
to accept the goods exists, and that otherwise the amount of liability is subject to agreement at both the time of contracting and at the time of a subsequent request for its increase. 319 The validity of this conclusion is questionable, since it is also admitted that "the request is binding . . . where the
increase of liability is not contrary to the tariff" if any.8 20 Consonant with this
admission, it is speculated that even if a request subsequent to the storage
agreement were binding without the warehouseman's assent, he could terminate
the agreement under section 7-206.821
although it applied). See Farmers Grain, Livestock & Co-op. Mercantile Ass'n v. Commodity
Credit Corp., 145 F. Supp. 788 (D. Kan. 1956); Samelson v. Harper's Furs, Inc., 20 Conn.
Supp. 37, 120 A.2d 429 (C.P. 1955), aff'd, 144 Conn. 368, 131 A.2d 827 (1956); Rosendahl
v. Lemhi Valley Bank, 43 Idaho 273, 251 Pac. 293 (1926).
314. N.Y. Leg. Doc. No. 65(H), p. 32 (1955).
315. "Damages may be limited by . . . agreement limiting the amount of liability ...
beyond which the warehouseman shall not be liable .

. . ."

N.Y.U.C.C. § 7-204(2). Sec

notes 297-303 supra and accompanying text. The Code also prohibits the warehouseman
from contracting for immunity from liability for negligence. N.Y.U.C.C. § 7-201(3). It also
invalidates limitations of liability where the warehouseman has converted the goods to his
own use. N.Y.U.C.C. § 7-204(2).
316. Uniform Commercial Code § 7-204, comment.
317. N.Y.U.C.C. § 7-204(2). Colorado has added this proviso to its enactment of the
Uniform Warehouse Receipts Act. Colo. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 146-2-14 (1953). It seems,
however, that it has engendered no litigation.
318. N.Y. Leg. Doc. No. 65(H), pp. 32-33 (1955).
319.
320.
321.

Id. at 33.
Ibid.
Ibid.

1963]

COM1MENTS

It seems that the last two conclusions are erroneous. It is obvious that
once a storage contract with a limitation of liability is made, the warehouseman is bound unless some provision of the Code or other rule of law allows
him to terminate the agreement. If the bailor performs, as by paying the
charges and performing other contract requirements, the storage contract could
be terminated only at such time or under such circumstances as the Code permits. These are where the period fixed by the contract is terminated by notice
to the bailor, or if no period is fixed, within not less than thirty days after such
notification; 3-22 where the warehouseman believes in good faith that "the goods
are about to deteriorate or decline in value to less than the amount of his
3
lien;"'a
and, finally, where the quality or condition of the goods of which
the warehouseman was unaware at the
time of deposit makes them a hazard
32 4
to the other goods or the warehouse
One need only consider a contract of storage for a term of years, where the
goods are such as would neither deteriorate in value nor become hazardous,
to conclude that the proviso in question gives to the bailor the freedom unilaterally to impose any liability he may choose so long as the corresponding tariff,
if any, is not exceeded. Here no provision of section 7-206 would operate to
allow the warehouseman to terminate the contract of storage, nor could the
bailor be held to have breached the contract by exercising his Code-given
right to increase the valuation of his goods.
The final report of the Commission expressly disapproved the instant proviso,
while approving the remainder of section 7-204.325 This disapproval was based
not upon the reasoning above, but upon the grounds that the provision was
regulatory in nature, and that its operation might thereby be restricted only
to instances where "rates vary with stated valuations according to tariffs." -° It
is then said that if this be its nature, the provision is superfluous in view of
section 7-103, which acknowledges the precedence of any federal or state
regulatory statute or tariff.32 7 It is enough to point out that, except in rare
instances, no such tariff or regulation exists in this state. '-2
The great similarity between warehousemen and carriers has not prompted
322. N.Y.U.C.C.
323.

§ 7-206(1).

N.Y.U.C.C. § 7-2C6(2).

324. N.Y.U.C.C. § 7-206(3).
325. Report of the Law Revision Commission, App. IN, at 442 (1956).
326. Ibid.
327. Ibid.
328. Federally licensed warehouses are regulated by the United States Warehouse Act,
39 Stat. 4S6 (1916), as amended, 7 U.S.C. §§ 241-73 (1953), which also forbids nonacceptance of agricultural goods when tendered in suitable condition for warehousing.
39 Stat. 483 (1916), 7 U.S.C. § 254 (1958). In the absence of statute, .-arehousemen are
not obligated by law to receive goods tendered for storage. Bogert v. Haight, 20 Barb. 251
(N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1S55); Dobie, Bailments & Carriers 160 (1914). Uniform Commercial Code
§ 7-204(4) allows for the insertion of any state provision which the Code is not meant to
supervene, and was not adopted in New York.

